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R. H. Guthrie*

DNA Technology: Are We
Ready?

I. Introduction
It is a common practice to identify certain historical periods with the
name of the most significant technological invention of the time.
Thus, we have had an Industrial Revolution, an Age of Steam, the
Automotive Age, and so on, up to the Atomic Age. We are now at
the crossroads of a new age; the Age of Biology.
This new age promises to be every bit as influential in terms of
broad social impact as any of its predecessors, and may ultimately
profoundly modify the way in which we define our lives. The
hallmark of this new age is DNA technology, the ability to
manipulate the genetic make-up of living organisms; and like most
new techologies, this one must be treated with respect in order to
maximize the benefits while minimizing the attendant disruptions
and risks. The purpose of this article is to explore alternative ways
of dealing with DNA technology, and to recommend a safe as well
as workable course of action.
II. Background
BiologicalBackground
In 1953, James D. Watson and Francis Crick first described the
molecular structure of deoxyribonucleic acid, DNA, the carrier of
the genetic codes that determine the myriad functions of life.' This
discovery was the forerunner of a whole new biological
technological explosion. This new science is still in its infancy, but
has nevertheless grown over the past decade to the point where
molecules of DNA have been taken apart, modified, and
recombined, termed Recombinant DNA. This achievement is of
such magnitude that it has been termed "as significant as the
2
splitting of the atom".
DNA can be visualized as a spiral ladder of two complimentary
*R. H. Guthrie, LL.B. Dalhousie, 1981.
1. R. Gore, Exploring the New Biology (1976), 150 National Geographic 355, at

359

2. R. Sinsheimer, Chairman of the Biology Division of Cal Tech., before the U.S.
Senate Health subcommittee, reported in (1977) 194 Science 303
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strands of chemical compounds called nucleotides. 3 There are four
of these; adenine, thymine, cytocine, and guanine, abbreviated
A,T,C, and G respectively. The nucleotides in each strand line up
end to end like so many box-cars, and they compliment each other
sideways, so that T is always opposite A, and C is always opposite
G. Thus, a segment of DNA could be shown as:
-A-T-T-C-G-A-A-G-T-T-A-A-G-C-T-T-C-Awith the physical attraction between the two strands being
indicated by the dots.
Units of nucleotides are called genes, each of which contains the
information for a specific function of the cell, and which may
contain as many as ten thousand letters. Groups of genes are united
to form chromosomes, which may contain many thousands of
genes. The total gene compliment of the cell is called the genome.
The transmission of essential genetic information between
generations depends upon precise replication of the nucleotide
sequences of DNA. Under appropriate conditions, the affinity
between the two strands reduces, so that they unwind and separate.
Free nucleotides line up next to their opposite number (i.e. G
opposite C; A opposite T) and are coupled end-to-end by an
appropriate enzyme. When the process is complete, there are two
identical helices.
Plasmids: Apart from the DNA contained in the cell, there are
self-replicating loops of DNA called plasmids that can be
maintained in the cell independently of the host chromosomes.
These plasmids impart certain characteristics or abilities to the cells,
which abilities are then transmitted to daughter cells when the host
cell divides.
Viruses: Viruses are parasitic organisms which contain their own
genetic information, but which require a host cell for growth and
propagation. The viral genome may react in the cell in different
ways; replicating to form new virus particles which eventually are
3. The description that follows is generally garnered from the Medical Research
Council of Canada's Guidelinesfor Handling ofRecombinant DNA Molecules and
Animal Viruses and Cells, 1977, ch. 1, catalogue number MR 21-1/1977, ISBN
0-662-00587-2, hereafter called MRC guidelines 1977. See also C. Grobstein The
Recombinant DNA Debate (1977), 237 Scientific American 23, at 23-25; and
National Geographic, supra note 1, at 365-367
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released, often killing the cell in the process, or trading genetic
material with the host genome, which may turn influence the
4
function of that cell when it replicates.
The Technology
As a way of improving on nature, genetic engineering is not a new
idea. Selective breeding in animal husbandry has probably been
practiced since man first domesticated animals. What is new,
however, is the use of micro-organisms to do the job.
Plasmid Transfer: During the early 1970's, Dr. Andra M.
Chakrabarty of General Electric's Research Centre was investigating the oil digesting characteristics of certain naturally occuring
bacteria. 5 He chemically separated the function-causing plasmid
from four such micro-organisms (each of which had a separate
oil-disintegrating characteristic) and implanted all four plasmids
into a Pseudomonas bacteria that could reproduce with all four
plasmids intact. The resultant "super bug" digests the four main
components (hydro-carbons) of crude oil, leaving the by-products
of water, carbon dioxide, and bacterial protein, and is not only
commercially feasible as an answer to oil spills, but has been
6
patented in the U.K.,and in the U.S.
Recombinat DNA: More basic, although not necessarily more
sophisticated in terms of technical difficulty, is the restructuring of
DNA itself. 7 Certain enzymes called "restriction enzymes" attack
and cut DNA at specific sequences so as to leave overhanging,
single stranded, sticky ends. Each particular enzyme is remarkably
specific, and cuts DNA only in its own peculiar way, always
leaving the same sticky ends. Thus 8 for one of the restriction
enzymes commonly used (E co R1) the sequence
-A-T-G-G-A-A-T-T-C-T-A-A-T-A-C-C-T-T-A-A-G-A-T-T-

4. There is considerable evidence that such viral genomes contribute to the
formation of cancer in several different types of animals, MRC Guidelines1977, at

3
5. Supra note 1, at 374-375
6. Commissionerof Patents and Trademarks v. Ananda M. Chakrabarty(1980),

48 U.S. Law Week 4714
7. Supra note 3
8. MRC Guidelines 1977, at 9
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is cut so as to produce
-A-T-G-G-T-A-C-C-T-T-A-A

and-A-A-T-T-C-T-A-A-G-A-T-T-

Since all DNA molecules from living systems are likely to
contain this sequence at some point along their length, it is possible
to take DNA fragments from dissimilar organisms and mix them.
The overhanging (sticky) ends of the fragments lock together and
form a single loop of recombinant DNA, now termed a vector.
The next step is to put the vector into a suitable host organism.
This is usually accomplished using a common and thoroughly
genetically mapped intestinal bacterium, Escherichia coli (E coli).
In addition to its single large chromosome, E coli contains one or
more plasmids. Typically, it is these plasmids which are isolated
from the bacteria, broken open by restriction enzymes, and used as
one side of a vector. After the "foreign" DNA has been introduced
and the DNA loop closed, the plasmid or vector is returned to the
cell. This procedure results in a strain of bacteria that will exhibit
genetic characteristics derived from the implanted DNA and which
will reproduce independently and truly.
The above describes only part of the technology. To be of any use
it is important to be able to isolate and replicate specific sequences
coding for desired functions. This can be done in either of two
ways. In the first, the DNA sequence responsible for a certain
function, for example the production of insulin, is identified and
purified, then used in a recombinant vector and placed in a host.
This method has the advantage of being safe, in that the
experimenter is aware of what is happening at all times, but has the
corresponding disadvantage of being rather tedious.
In the second method, all the DNA from the desired function
organism is fragmented by enzymes. The fragments are randomly
introduced to vectors, and then colonies of host cells to which these
vectors have been introduced are cultured. The experimenter picks
from the many thousands of host colonies so produced the ones
which carry or exhibit the desired abilities. This method has been
dubbed the "shotgun" approach, and is potentially considerably
more dangerous than the first method. Since the DNA used is
impure and uncharacterized, the fragment containing the desired
DNA (or host colony exhibiting the desired function) may also carry
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undesirable or even pathogenic genes which though controlled in
the original cells, could be free to reproduce in the new organism.
PotentialBenefits
DNA technology allows the brightest hope for efficient mass
production of many of the compounds and products required for the
treatment of human diseases and which at present can only be
produced by extraction from animal and human tissues. A prime
example is the production of insulin. Long the subject of intensive
research, insulin was recently successfully fabricated by scientists
of the National Research Council, using recombinant DNA
technology. 9 While as yet there is no industrial production using
this technique, it would seem to be only a matter of time. Certainly
there is a ready market; there are an estimated 200,000 diabetics in
Canada requiring insulin daily.
Similarly we should see very soon the commercial production of
human growth hormone (which controls growth rates in humans.
The lack of this hormone causes "pituitary dwarfs".) and
interferon, an anti-viral agent which may be a cure for certain kinds
of cancer. 10
Further, there are experiments in the agricultural field that could
have wide reaching effects. Scientists are experimenting with such
ideas as drought-resistant corn, borrowing the drought-resistant
properties of sorghum, and wheat that has borrowed nitrogen-fixing
genes from either bacteria exhibiting that property or from the
nitrogen-fixing legumes." In general, while many potential
benefits cannot as yet be realized, and further developments of
technique may be required, there does not seem to be any theoretical
limitation to the full and wide-ranging application of DNA
2
technology. '
The Hazards
In 1974, in a letter sent to Nature Magazine in Britain and Science
9. The Mail-Star (Halifax), Thursday, 10 Apr. 80.
10. Biogen S.A., a Swiss firm specializing in recombinant DNA techniques,
announced in Jan., 1980, that it had induced bacteria to produce a facsimile of
human interferon. Without such technology, production of interferon is incredibly
painstaking. CAL Tech scientists estimate that at todays prices and technology, a
pound of pure interferon would cost between $10 billion and $20 billion. Time,
March 31, 1980, at47
II. Supra note I, at 390
12. MRC Guidelines 1977, at 14
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Magazine in the United States 13 , eleven members of the National
Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, declared a
moritorium on recombinant DNA research and urged all scientists
working in the area to join them, until such time as ". . . attempts
have been made to evaluate the hazards and some resolution of the
14
outstanding questions has been achieved."
The hazards they envisioned were many. One of the most
frequently used host organisms in recombinant DNA experiments is
Eschericha coli (E coli), a bacteria that inhibits the human gut. E
coli is an ideal host in that it is probably the most researched
bacteria in the world, with a thoroughly mapped genome 15 , and yet
to use this organism is surely asking for trouble. E. Chargaff, Ph.D.
professor emeritus of biochemistry of Columbia University, writes,
"It will eventually get into human beings and animals despite all the
precautions of containment.''16 There has already been one near
miss. In 1975, A. Chakrabarty, a microbiologist at General
Electrics' Research and Development Centre, put together an E coli
bacterium containing the gene for cellulase, an enzyme that breaks
down cellulose. Cellulose is indigestible to humans, and gives bulk
to the feces. Should the modified E coli infest the human gut, the
result could be chronic and even fatal diarrhea. Because of this, the
bacterium was destroyed. 17
Hazards are also envisioned if the presence of recombinant DNA
in the host cell confers upon it the capacity for more rapid growth or
greater survival. This problem is particularly evident as regards
antibiotic resistance in bacteria, which phenomenon occurs
naturally in high contamination areas like hospitals, where new
pathogenic strains of bacteria that have acquired resistance to
specific antibiotics are constantly appearing. Care must be taken
that any escaped host and vector do not add the spread of antibiotic
resistance. 18
Most fundamental, however, is the fear of the unknown. We
simply do not know what will happen. R. L. Sinsheimer of the
13. P. Berg et al., PotentialBiohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules (1974),
183 Science 303. See also Nature, 19 July, 1974
14. Science, ibid. at 303
15. M. Kukin, Research and Recombinant DNA, New York State Journal of
Medicine, Feb. 1978 at 228
16. Ibid. at 228, quoted from Fruits of Gene juggling: blessing or curse?, M.
World News 17:45 (Oct. 4) 1979
17. N. Wade, Dicing with Nature: Three Narrow Escapes, (1977), 195 Science
378
18. MRC Guidelines, 1977, at 15
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California Institute of Technology has been quite outspoken in this
regard. In June, 1976, at the University of California he said:
I do fear that there are potentially grevious risks - of the spread
of slow viruses, or of cancer, or of new pathogens yet unborn,
evolved from our inventions. 19
Further, noting the fundamental difference between the simple
prokaryotic organisms like bacteria, which have a free floating
chromosome and no nucleus, and the complex eukaryotic cells like
human cells, with a nucleus bounded by a membrane containing a
number of far more complex chromosomes, he postulates a genetic
barrier behind which the eukaryotes have developed their more
complex mechanisms of genetic control. To transfer these
mechanisms, possibly the key to the evolutionary success of the
eukaryotes, to prokaryotes, may introduce incalculable evolutionary
damage. The prokaryotes may be made far more effective as
competitors and parasites, negating an ancient evoluntionary
20
strategy.
However dangerous, the research is ongoing. The self-imposed
moratorium lasted only long enough to hammer out some basic
research guidelines. 2 1 There is a good deal of controversy over the
extent of the danger presented by the research, and many scientists
feel that the original fears of "Andromeda strain" 22 type epidemics
were overstated. B. Davis, Professor of Bacterial Physiology at
Harvard Medical School states:
I conclude that while the proposed kinds of experiments present a
small but finite danger of causing laboratory infection, the danger
to the public is infinitesimel and does not warrant current public
anxiety. While the present NIH guidelines are a reasonable
response to that anxiety, they 23
are an excessively restrictive
response to the scientific realities.
19. Supra note 2, at 304
20. Scientific American, supra note 3, at 28
21. In February, 1975, the International Conference on Recombinant DNA
Molecules was held in the United States at Asilomar, on the Pacific seaboard. See
Berg, Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules (1975), 188 Science
991. Subsequently the National Institute of Health (NIH) released guidelines in
June 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 27911 (1976) (hereafter cited as NIH Guidelines). Similar
guidelines were proposed in Britain by the Williams Working Party on the Practice
of Genetic Minipulation in August, 1976, and the Genetic Manipulation Advisory
Group (GMAG) was established in December 1976. Canada followed suit with the
MRC Guidelines, supra note 3, in 1977.
22. The Andromeda Strain, science fiction by M. Crichton, about a "super virus"
that destroys the worlds population.
23. Supra note 15, at 229, quoting from a paper, NaturalSelection, Viralance and
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The problem now, therefore, is to decide what is the appropriate
response to take.
The remainder of this paper will explore some of the possibilities.
III. ControllingDNA Technology
TraditionalApproach:Do Nothing
The common law's traditional approach to potential problems is to
"do nothing", and to wait for the problems to define themselves
before looking for solutions. For individual actions arising out of
DNA technology, this may be an acceptable solution. The
machinery for handling tort and contract problems is well
established, and even if the subject matter is novel, the principles of
relief are fairly well established. There are, however, serious
deficiencies in such an approach.
First, in the traditional tort action, liability is based on
negligence, which is defined as, "conduct

. .

. which falls below

the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm". 24 The problem is that for DNA
technology, there is as yet no well defined "established standard"
for the reasonably prudent DNA researcher. 25 Even were this well
defined, one questions whether traditional "negligence" and
"reasonableness" concepts should be the standard against which
accidents arising from this technology should be judged. One can
imagine sufficient difficulties in proving causation. Given the
already-voiced concerns over unforseeable consequences, the fact
that the accident could be proven non-negligent should be
irrelevant.2 6 One gravitates naturally, in this case, towards the
concept of absolute liability.
Communicability, presented in 1977 to the National Academy of Sciences Focus on
Research with Recombinant DNA.
24. (1934), Restatement of Torts 282
25. See RecombinantDNA, (1977), 11 Georgia Law Review 785 at 813-815
26. In fact, it is the "non negligent" or "impossible" accident that we should
fear, and against which we must protect ourselves. In Roe v. Minister of Health,
[1954] 2. Q.B. 66, invisible cracks in ampoules of the anaesthetic nupercaine had
allowed the anaesthetic to become contaminated by the phenol solution in which
the ampoules were stored. Two patients on which the contaminated nupercaine was
used were permenantly paralysed from the waist down as a result. There was no
question of causation, but the hospital and doctors all escaped liability. No one had
acted negligently, nor had any of the normal precautions been omited, so by
traditional tort law, no liability attached. Such a finding keeps legal theory clean
and neat, but one wonders if, under the circumstances, the onus has not been placed
on the wrong shoulders.
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Further, the biohazards feared go beyond concerns of individual
injury, and focus on accidents which affect whole groups of people
in some major, catastrophic way. There have been analogous
occurrences in the past, such as the Thalidomide disaster of the late
1960's. To leave the victims of such misfortune totally at the mercy
of traditional tort law is often to appear barbaric and unsympathetic,
and yet there is rarely any alternative.2 7 This is not to say that the
traditional approach is always wrong. Tort law is a tempered tool
that has and shall continue to serve us well. But given our ability to
forsee consequences and potentially grevious situations, such as
with the DNA technology confronting us now, one envisages policy
decisions which specifically address questions like apportionment
of loss. For the policy makers to leave these decisions to the courts
appears not only to be an abdication of responsibility, but
considering the potential magnitude of the problem, an unconscionable decision for rational human beings.
Total Prohibition
At the opposite end of the spectrum of possible responses, there is
the possibility of total prohibition. While questions about just such a
solution have been seriously asked 28 , prohibition is not considered a
feasible proposition: the potential benefit of DNA research are too
great, and the dangers are seen as too small for prohibition to be
effective, even if it were not next to impossible to enforce. It is felt
that prohibition of DNA research would meet with the same success
as did the liquor prohibition of the 1920's, and as does the ban on
marijuana today.
27. See generally, H. Teff and C. Munro, Thalidomide: The Legal Aftermath,
(1976) Thalidomide was manufactured and licensed in England by Distillers
Company (Biochemicals) Limited. As it slowly became apparent that the drug did
cause birth defects, 62 writs of negligence were issued against Distillers within the
3-year time limit for such actions (running from the date of birth of the child). The
subsequent legal controversy centered around whether or not Distillers had actually
been negligent in marketing the drug. The end result for these first 62 claims was a
settelement (in which all claimants had to agree) of 40% of the average total
amount that would have been awarded had negligence been proven. As part of the
;ettlement the allegations of negligence were dropped. There were other claims,
both in Britain and in other countries and settlement amount varied. On the whole,
lowever, one feels that the victims remained just that: victims to the end.
1.8. Supra note 15, at 230, quoting, L. F. Cavalieri, New Strains of Life - or
)eath, New York Times Magazine, 22 Aug., 1976
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Viable Approaches
In a paper dealing with the legal mechanisms that will be required to
face the DNA Biohazard, 29 T.A. Balmer has suggested that the
following elements should characterize an appropriate response:
(a) Comprehensiveness- that is, applying to all research;
(b) Flexibility - so that any standards set can be quickly
changed to reflect up-to-date knowledge;
(c) Detail - so that the precautions required are realistic and
match the hazard;
(d) Participation- that is, that as the, hazards are not limited to
the scientists that perform the experiments, deciding to take
the risks is not merely a scientific question, but one requiring
public awareness and imput.
These characteristics appear to be well founded. However, one
over-riding characteristic should be added: so far as humanly
possible, keeping in mind the need to control, but not to control to
the point of stifling, the system set up to handle DNA technology
and the attendant hazards must work!
With these considerations in mind, let us review and evaluate
what has already been done.
Guidelines
As discussed earlier, the results of the moritorium letter and the
Asilomar conference 30 have been guidelines which attempt to
regulate DNA experimentation. These must be viewed as a serious
and commendable attempts to deal with the potential hazards, but
one wonders if they are sufficient.
Canadian guidelines propose both physical and biological
containment for experiments, and in fact go farther than the
American or British counter-parts, in that they apply to animal
viruses and cells, as well as to Recombinant DNA Molecules. 31
However, the guidelines themselves are the product of the scientific
community. While this is not necessarily bad, and does not
necessarily imply a conflict of interest, still one should retain a
health skepticism. Scientists may not be the best judges of the
controls to be placed on their own professional pursuits. Sinsheimer
29. Balmer, Recombinant DNA: Legal Responses to a New Biohazard (1977), 7
Environmental Law 300
30. Supra note 21
31. In June 1979, MRC published revised guidelines, Cat. No. MR21 - 1/1979,
ISBN 0-662-50256-6
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explains "Scientists can be very insular . . . you have to believe
what you are doing is good and beneficial. ' 32 One questions
seriously, for example, the continued use of E. coli strains as
33
host-vectors, in spite of the biological weakening of this bacteria.
As well, the present guidelines do not fully cover the hazards. For
example, Chakrabarty's experiments involving, as they do, plasmid
transfer rather than recombinant DNA technology 34 are not
covered. However, because of the robustness of such bacteria (due
to their commercial application) they may present a greater hazard
35
than recombinant DNA molecules.
Of major concern is the lack of enforceability of the guidelines.
While the Principal Investigator and the local biohazard Committees
are responsible for seeing that the guidelines are followed 36 , the
sole sanction for a failure to follow the guidelines appears to be a
possible discontinuance of MRC grants. 3 7 Further, the guidelines
do not apply to industry, which means that no matter how well
drafted or effective they are within their sphere, as a control on the
technology as whole they are inaffective.3
Finally, the efficacy of guidelines of any sort has been
questioned. Cavalieri warns that guidelines may lull us into a false
sense of security 39 and may not be strictly followed, which appears
40
to be the case on at least one documented occasion in the U.S.
In conclusion then, guidelines are seen as a step in the right
direction, but they fail to meet all criteria previously outlined.
While they are detailed, flexible, and participatory 41 , they are not
32. Quoted in(1976), 194 Science 305
33. Supra notes 16-18
34. Supra note 5
35. Paraphrase of discussion with Dr. W. F. Doolitfle, Associate Professor of
Biochemistry, Dalhousie University. Dr. Doolittle is himself engaged in
Recombinant DNA experimentation.
36. Supra note 31, at 47-50
37. Ibid at preface.
38. The problem is the same in the U.S., Supra note 15, at 231. GMAG is
;omewhat different in that it applies to British industry, but has no direct statutory
'orce. Rather it survives under the broad umbrella of Health and Safety at Work
4ct, which lays a duty on all employers and employees to work in the safest way
•easonably practical, and provides that failure to do so is a criminal offense.
Vickers, Flexible DNA Regulation: The British Model, Bulletin of the Atomic
3cientists, January 1978, at 4
39. Supra note 26
10. Recombinant DNA: NIH Rules Broken in Insulin Gene Project (1977), 197
3cience 1342
H. For example, the present 10-person MRC Biohazards Committee includes a
:orporate vice-president, a layman, a cleric, and a law professor.
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comprehensive or effective, and it is these missing characteristics
which the author considers the most vital.
Legislation
Legislation, in one form or another, is considered the only realistic
method of meeting the biohazard presented. 42 While there are
numerous forms such legislation could take, a preliminary broad
concern, and by no means a simple one, is the questions of
constitutional jurisdiction.
Logically, there should one standard (or set of standards) which
applies equally and without favour or discrimination to all agencies
and experimenters involved in DNA technology. This may indicate
a need for federal rather than provincial legislation. However, the
43
subject matter does not fit into any neat categories.
On the provincial side, it can be argued that what is being
regulated is a single industry being carried on in the province, and
constitutional cases from Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons4 4 to the
present have consistently upheld the exclusion of federal legislation
from this area. In a recent decision dealing with the constitutionality
of the federal regulations dealing with the labelling of beer under the
Food and DrugsAct, 45 the statute and its implementing regulations
providing virtually a code governing the manufacture of malt liquor,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the regulating of the production
process of a single industry isprimafaciea local matter.
On the other hand, there are strong arguments that can be made
for federal jurisdiction, especially under the federal residual power
for peace, order and good government. In R. y. Houser 46 the
Supreme Court upheld the Narcotics Control Act under the federal
residual power as legislation adopted to deal with a genuinely new
problem which did not exist at the time of confederation, and which
went beyond the class of matters of a merely local or private nature.
If this argument is valid for narcotics, it is doubly valid for genetic
42. See M. Mitchell et al. Medical Research Council Committee draws up
guidelines for research into recombinant DNA (1977), 116 CMA Journal 804
43. In the U.S., for example, the question has not been resolved. In the absence of
Federal Legislation, which while in the making, has yet to get off the ground, See
Wade, Congress set to Grapple Again with Gene Splicing (1978), 199 Science
1319. State and municipal legislatures are enacting regulations. See Wade, Gene Splicing: at GrassRoots Level a HundredFlowersBloom (1977), 195 Science 558
44. (1881-83), 7 App. Cas. 96
45. Labatt'sBreweries v. Att. Gen. of Canada (1979), 30 N.R. 496
46. (1979), 46 C.C.C. (2d) 481 (S.C.C.)
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engineering. In addition, Estey J. in the Labatt's case 47 said:
• . . Parliament may make laws in relation to health for the
peace, order and good government of Canada; quarantine laws
come to mind as one example. The Privy Council hinted that
legislation enacted by Parliament to deal with an "epidemic of
pestilence" would be valid in Toronto ElectricCommissioners v.
Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
This statement would appear to cover exactly the ground with
which we are concerned.
The above discussion does not purport to be a definitive
exploration of the constitutional question. As originally stated, there
is no simple solution. It is suggested, however, that the resolution
is, in the final analysis, a question of policy. The courts must place
the legislative power where it will be most effective to deal with the
foreseen hazard, and to this author at least, that means in the hands
of the federal government.
Form of Legislation
Having traversed the constitutional maze, there is still the question
of the form the required legislation should take.
On the one hand, one does not want to stifle scientific enthusiasm
or development by being too restrictive. On the other hand, having
identified a need for some restrictions (whatever they are
determined to be), one would like to set up a system in which the
consequences of disregarding the restrictions are so prohibitive that
such an eventuality is unlikely.
Further, there is the previously discussed desirability of
alleviating the rigours of traditional tort law by legislatively
dispensing with the concept of negligence in favour of a concept of
absolute liability. 48 Finally, one would hope to be able to set up a
system such that those involved in the technology police
themselves.
These kind of considerations have already been faced in the area
of atomic energy, and the legislation enacted to regulate that
technology can serve as a model for Biohazard regulation. 4 9 The
Atomic Energy ControlAct 50 was set up to control and supervise the
47. Supra note 45, at 512
48. Supra, atp. 10
49. This is especially true when considering the similarities between the
technologies in their novelty, social impact, and potential dangers.
50. R.S.C. 1970, c. A-19
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development, application, and use of atomic energy. As a first step,
what is envisiged is a "Genetic Engineering Control Act" set along
similar lines. Without going into any detail on the specific
provisions contents of the act, it should:
(a) apply to the whole field of genetic engineering;
(b) apply to both the public and private sectors, including crown
corporations;
(c) be mainly concerned with setting out mandatory guidelines.
This could be done through a Board such as the present MRC
Biohazards Committee; there could also be provisions for an
annual review of the "state of the art" so the guidelines
remained flexible; and
(d) provide for fines and/or imprisonment for both the
experimenter and the institution within which the experimenter works, for failure to comply with the act or any
regulations (the guidelines) made under it.
Secondly, again following the lead of nuclear technology,5' a
"Biological Hazards Liability Act" is needed. This act would:
(a) Impose a duty on both the experimenter and the institution
for the genetic engineering being carried on;
(b) provide for absolute liability for injuries;
(c) set out mandatory levels of insurance to be carried;
(d) possibly have some licensing requirement;
(e) set up a committee to handle claims under the act;
It is realized that the acts proposed could well become terribly
restrictive. Any licensing requirements for example, could hinder
research a great deal if the criteria for granting them became too
strenuous. In drafting the legislation therefore, (and in subsequently
administering the acts, should they ever be born) what must be kept
in mind, is that, rather than trying to restrict the technology, per se,
the legislation is aimed at laying the responsibility for monitoring
the technology in the hands of the practicioners. In short, one
aspires toward the optimum system wherein it is in the industry's
best interest to regulate itself.
Patentability
Finally, we must look at the products of this technology and provide
for them. This is not seen as a separate or alternative solution in the
51. NuclearLiability Act, R.S.C. 1970 (lst Supp.), c. 29
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overall handling of DNA Technology, but rather as simply one
more aspect of the total problem which must be addressed in
conjunction with all other aspects.
The products of genetic engineering are potentially of immense
use to human beings, and consequently in the commercial sense, of
potentially immense value. In its Interferon cover story, Time
Magazine 52 states, "The drug companies know that there is a gold
mine in interferon. They are scrambling like mad to produce it."
The traditional way of protecting a valued product in industry is
through copyright, trade secret or patent. In this context, copyright
is not applicable, and the trade secret route is considered
inappropriate. The concepts and procedures described herein, of
dealing with genetic engineering in any realistic way, would be
totally thwarted by industrial secrecy. In fact, the best way of
ensuring that industry is not even tempted by the trade secret
approach may be to include in the "Genetic Engineering Control
Act" described above a provision stipulating that neither the
products of genetic engineering nor the direct manufacturing
processes are subject to trade secret or trade secret law.
This leaves the question of patentability. Lagging behind the UK
by several years, the US Supreme Court has finally resolved the
controversy in that country by a 5 to 4 decision in favour of the
patentability of living organisms. 53 It is only a matter of time before
54
the question comes before the Canadian Courts.
It is not at all certain that the patentability of living organisms is
an issue of major importance in the overall question of genetic
engineering, believing as the author does (pessimistically perhaps)
that where there is money to be made, industry will involve itself
regardless. Further it is not at all certain that patents will be
effective to protect the product. Micro organisms are subject to
quick and considerable manipulation. 55 Be that as it may, one of the
benefits of the patent system, that of "encouraging disclosure to the
52. Time, 31 March 1980, at47
53. Supra note 6
54. There is at present some controversy reported in the media over the patentability
of seeds in Canada. This may ultimately spark a confrontation of the issue. See also
the representative discussion in Guttag, The Patentability of Microorganisms
(1977), 13 U. of Richmond Law Rev. 247
55. Dr. S. D. Wainwright, Professor of Biochemistry, of Dalhousie University, is
of the opinion that patenting microorgnisms at least, is a lawyers' game only. He
feels that once you have a copy of the specially produced organism, it is a simple
step to modify it sufficiently to get around the patent laws.
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public of mertiorious inventions. .. ,,56 is consistent with the
general theme of controlling the whole technology in a meaningful
way. If allowing the products of DNA Technology to be patented
aids at all in ensuring adherence to the guidelines and safe handling
of the technology, the patentability in Canada is a desirable
occurrence, (within, of course, the normal patent requirements, of
newness, usefullness, etc.). With this in mind, it is probably worth
while to bypass the impending legal controversy right now, by
amending the present PatentAct to clearly allow living organisms to
be patented.
IV. Conclusion
DNA technology has tremendous potential to ameliorate many
human disabilities and should be viewed as a beneficial
undertaking. However, there are also potentially serious and far
reaching consequences to DNA experiments, and both the industry
and the individuals involved in the research must constantly be on
guard and cognizant of their duty of care to society.
The present MRC guidelines are an inadequate control on DNA
research. Federal legislation is needed to produce nation-wide
mandatory guidelines with penalties for non-compliance, and to
enact an absolute liability statute that places responsibility for safety
directly with the experimenters. Further, the products of DNA
experimentation should not be allowed to be the subject to trade
secret law, but should be patentable under an amendment to our
present PatentAct.
It is felt that only a coordinated control system such as herein
described will provide the atmosphere of care and diligence needed
within the industry and yet not be so restrictive as to stifle research.
Above all else, the time for action is now. There is sufficient
information available now to lead any rational human being to the
conclusion that positive controls are needed. Further delay would
not only be unconsciousable; it would be flirting with catastrophe.
56. Guttag, supra note 50, at 277
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